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Abstract: 

Whether to voluntarily self-disclose potential corporate criminal misconduct to the DOJ has long been among the most consequential decisions a company may face. This article traces the evolution of the DOJ’s CEP from its origins in the 2016 FCPA Pilot Program through the first Department-wide CEP issued in 2026, which extends the voluntary self-disclosure framework across virtually all DOJ components and U.S. Attorney’s Offices. This article examines how the criteria for voluntary self-disclosure, the incentives available to qualifying companies, and the treatment of aggravating circumstances, such as corporate recidivism, have been refined over time. The article also provides practical guidance on navigating the new self-disclosure calculus and concludes that, despite greater transparency and more favorable incentives, the decision to self-disclose remains a complex, fact-specific judgment that demands careful weighing of the benefits of coming forward against the potential costs.

Keywords: Corporate Enforcement Policy; Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”); Presumption of a Declination; Guaranteed Declination; “Corporate Recidivism”; Corporate Enforcement Priorities

Affiliations:  1: White & Case LLP; 2: White & Case; 3: White & Case; 4: White & Case.